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Over the last two decades, remittances by migrant workers to their families have become an 
important source of household incomes in many developing countries. At the economy-wide 
level, remittances have sustained demand for local goods and services and contributed to 
economic growth and poverty reduction. Unsurprisingly, in the current global recession, 
employment opportunities and earnings of migrant workers have suffered – not least 
because some important destination countries for migrant workers, including Russia, the 
United States, and Spain, have been hit particularly hard by the global crisis. Many 
destination countries have adopted policies to discourage further immigration and even push 
out those immigrants already in the country. Such protectionist policies threaten to undo the 
benefits that international labor migration has brought to both, home and destination 
countries. 
In this Policy Brief, we assess the extent of the decline in remittances and its impact on 
developing countries and review initial policy responses. On this basis, we propose policies 
for destination and home countries that take into account the long-term benefits of 
international labor migration particularly for migrants and their home countries. We argue that 
protectionist policies that shift the burden of adjustment onto labor migrants and their home 
countries are inappropriate and ultimately self-defeating in an increasingly interdependent 
world. Rather, host country governments should adopt a long-term perspective and gradually 
expand opportunities for international labor migration, not limited to high-skilled workers. 
Migrant Remittances and Economic Development 
World-wide, remittances have become a key financial flow to developing countries, rising 
from US$ 31 billion in 1990 to US$ 251 billion in 2007 (Figure 1). Remittances are now more 
than twice as large as total official development assistance to developing countries and a 
much more stable source of external finance over the years than direct or portfolio 
investment. 
In many developing countries, remittances have become a crucial source of income for 
many households (Figure 2). While large countries such as China and India top the list of 
recipients in terms of the value of remittances, small economies such as Tajikistan, Moldova, 
or Jordan display a particularly large ratio of remittances relative to GDP. Migrant remittan-
ces are difficult to estimate because a significant proportion is transmitted through informal 
channels like bus or lorry drivers or relatives, rather than through the banking system. 
Therefore, the data underlying Figures 1 and 2 probably represent the lower bound of plau-
sible estimates of migrant remittances.  
The main source countries of remittances (and destination countries for migrants) are 
high-income countries like the United States and several EU member states, along with 
Saudi Arabia and Russia (Figure 3). Although regionally disaggregated data on remittances 
are very limited, we can identify some important migration corridors. The United States is the 
main destination country for Mexican, other Central American, and many Indian migrants. 
Russia is temporary home to nearly all Tajik migrants as well as many Moldovans and 
Kyrgyz. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries host migrants from India, Pakistan and oil-
poor Arab countries. Western Europe is a popular destination for migrants from North Africa 
and Turkey and increasingly from Eastern Europe.    Kiel  Policy  Brief  10  2 / 13 
Research on the impact of international labor migration and remittances on migrants’ home 
countries confirms the strong positive impact of remittances not only on recipient households, 
but also at the economy-wide level. International labor migration implies that workers move 
from an economy where their productivity is low to one where it is high. Clearly, therefore, 
migrant workers and those with whom they share their additional income will benefit. While it 
is difficult to identify how additional household income is spent, studies for several high-
emigration countries document higher consumption of food and consumer durables as well 
as investments in family enterprises and in human capital, such as health care and educa-
tion. When barriers to migration are not high and migration is therefore not too costly, it may 
also help to reduce poverty in migrants’ countries of origin. When barriers are high, for exam-
ple because migration is illegal and facilitated by organized groups, the poorest households 
may be excluded from the migration process. 
















Source: World Bank staff estimates based IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 2008. 
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Beyond household-level effects, 
migrant remittances and higher 
disposable incomes generate addi-
tional demand for local goods and 
services as well as for imports. In 
many high-emigration countries, 
therefore, GDP (i.e. local output) 
has grown even as labor migrants 
left and the labor force declined; 
the economic recovery in many 
countries of the former Soviet 
Union since 2000 is a prominent 
example. At the same time, rising 
imports have boosted tax revenues 
(mostly value added tax, but also 
import duties) and have thus helped to stabilize government expenditures, including on social 
transfers and services for the poor. Therefore, when migration is large enough, the beneficial 
effects extend far beyond remittance-receiving households. 
There is some concern that emigration of high-skilled workers would deprive developing 
countries of human resources crucial for their economic development. While plausible, 
empirical evidence for negative brain-drain effects is limited. In some cases, high-skilled 
workers might not find appropriate employment at home; for example, health care may be 
particularly poor in the countryside, but without a functioning hospital infrastructure, physic-
cians and nurses would not remain in the countryside in any case. Furthermore, if emigration 
opportunities are better for more skilled workers, that may create a powerful incentive for 
people to acquire more skills – which may ultimately improve the skill level even of those 
workers who remain in the country (Beine, Docquier, Rapoport 2008). Last but not least, 
remittances often pay for skill acquisition by family members, such as extended school 
attendance or further education.  
While labor migration has clear economic benefits for migrants, their families, and their 
home countries, its effects on host country natives are more mixed. Local output will 
increase, but most of the extra output will go to immigrants themselves. Those groups of 
local workers who most resemble migrants in terms of skills and work experience are likely to 
lose because of greater competition in their labor market segments. Other workers with 
complementary skills may benefit, as may consumers who gain access to services (for 
example, long-term care at home) that they could not otherwise afford. Similarly, owners of 
scarce local resources like housing may enjoy higher incomes (Ortega, Peri, 2009; Borjas, 
2009; Ottaviano, Peri, 2008). The fiscal effects of immigration may be positive if immigrants 
are mostly young, legally employed, pay taxes and social insurance contributions, and have 
few dependents; or negative if immigrants face high unemployment rates and have access to 
social services. In ageing societies, immigration may soften the trend towards a lower total 
population, higher average age, and higher dependency ratios. On the whole, the effects on 
host country natives tend to be small in relation both to host country GDP and to the clear 
benefits of migration for migrants and their countries of origin. 
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Therefore, the argument has recently gained ground that immigration policy in high-
income countries should take into account its impact on (current and potential) migrants and 
on individuals in developing countries generally. At present, the coincidence of where a 
person happens to have been born (for example, in a high-income vs. a low-income country) 
has a much greater impact on their material well-being than factors such as gender, skin 
color or handicap, although possible discrimination against individuals based on the latter 
factors attracts much more attention (Clemens, Montenegro, Pritchett, 2008). The current 
global recession is hitting not only many important host countries of labor migrants, but also 
their countries of origin. If rich host countries were to attempt to shut out migrants, migrants 
and their families would face extra hardship because they would not easily find alternative 
employment opportunities at home. Arguably, also, even a cautious opening of rich-country 
labor markets to immigrants from developing countries would reduce poverty in developing 
countries more effectively than much current development assistance. Thus, immigration and 
development policies are closely intertwined and need to be considered in context, as we 
discuss further below in more detail. 
The Impact of the Global Recession on Migration and Remittances 
The global financial crisis and the subsequent recession have simultaneously afflicted 
destination and home countries of labor migrants. Both deteriorating labor market conditions 
in destination countries and the economic slowdown in many home countries will shape 
migration flows in the short to medium run. However, the long-run drivers of migration flows 
are unlikely to be weakened by the crisis: The persisting wage differentials and demographic 
imbalances between destination and home countries are too large to be fundamentally 
affected (see Box 1). 
So far, the economic slowdown has been particularly marked in developed countries, 
including several key destination countries of labor migrants. As a result, unemployment 
rates have increased sharply in several countries. Despite tentative signs that the downturn 
may be coming to an end, the lagged response of labor markets to GDP growth rates 
suggests that unemployment may increase yet further. The OECD (2009) reckons that the 
number of unemployed in the OECD will rise from 34 million in 2008 to more than 56 million 
in 2010.  
The crisis is hitting migrants particularly hard. Compared to the native-born population, 
they have been experiencing more job losses both in absolute and relative terms. In the US, 
for instance, the number of immigrant workers has decreased by about 9 percent since the 
third quarter of 2009, while the corresponding decline for native workers is about 4 percent 
(Camarota, Jensenius, 2009). Immigrants are more vulnerable than natives because they 
tend to work in sectors which are more responsive to the business cycle, above all 
construction and manufacturing, and typically have less permanent employment contracts. In 
addition, they are more likely to be disadvantaged through selective layoffs and hiring. At the 
same time, however, some immigrants hold jobs in sectors which are relatively resilient to 
the economic downturn. These activities include social services, food-processing, and 
cleaning (OECD 2009). Thus, a sizeable portion of migrant workers may not be severely 
affected by the crisis.   Kiel  Policy  Brief  10  5 / 13 
In most destination countries, decreasing demand for migrant labor has not yet resulted in 
a significant outflow of immigrants to their home countries. Depending on how long they 
expect the recession to last, some migrants may try to stay put, relying on savings or 
engaging in more irregular and temporary activities. Return migration is also unlikely to be an 
option for long-settled immigrants, especially for those who have already brought their 
families with them. In contrast, other migrants, above all temporary migrants, may find it a 
more viable strategy to return to their families. It remains to be seen, however, whether labor 
markets in origin countries can absorb significant numbers of returnees. After all, economic 
activities are also slowing down in many major origin countries (Figure 4), such as Mexico or 
Box 1. Determinants of international labor migration and the effects of the global  
recession 
The reasons behind labor movements between sectors and countries have long been discussed by 
economists.  Neo-classical models of labor movements posit that people migrate due to wage 
differentials between sectors and predict that wage differentials would be eliminated over time 
(Ranis and Fei, 1961).  These models assume perfect markets and fail to explain persistent wage 
differentials and unemployment.  Todaro’s extended model achieves this by assuming that the only 
determinant of migration decisions is expected income, however, it fails to account for the role of 
human capital in driving migration (Todaro, 1969). The human capital theory of migration deals with 
this shortcoming by accounting for the role of individual’s skills in determining productivity, wages 
and costs of migration based on Mincerian wage models. Most of these models treat migration as 
an individual decision; therefore, they cannot explain the existence of continuing interactions of 
migrants with their origins and the flow of remittances that play an important role in poverty 
reduction and rural development (Taylor and Martin, 2001).The New Economics of Labor Migration 
(NELM) posits that the migration decision is part of a household strategy rather than being purely 
individual and that multiple market failures – in particular capital and insurance – drive migration 
(Stark and Bloom, 1985; Stark, 1991). Under imperfect credit markets, remittances may relax the 
capital constraint and allow households to invest in their farms or businesses. If insurance markets 
are also missing and there is income uncertainty as is common in agriculture, migration may also 
serve as an income diversification strategy for the household. 
Push Factors  Pull Factors 
  Wage differentials between countries  
  Lack of employment opportunities  
  Imperfect credit and/or insurance markets 
 Demographic  factors 
 Political/religious  prosecution 
 Natural  disasters 
  Natural resource degradation 
  Demand for labor 
 Education 
  Lax anti-immigration laws 
 Demographic  factors 
  More political/economic freedoms 
  Better public services 
 Family  reunion 
These factors can be grouped under “push” and “pull” factors, which are, respectively, unfavorable 
conditions in the origin location and favorable conditions in the destination location (Ravenstein, 
1889). The financial crisis affects some of these factors in different ways, while leaving most of 
them unaffected. The most important and direct effect of the crisis is through its effects on the 
demand for labor. As the global economy slows, the demand for labor decreases in the short run 
especially in sectors that employ most migrants, such as construction and manufacturing. 
Contracting budgets in host countries that are hit by the crisis may also affect the funds available 
for education, increasing the costs of education for potential migrants. Another pull factor affected 
by the crisis is the anti-immigration laws. The increasing protectionist sentiment in destination 
countries is likely to decrease migration flows marginally in the short run.  
The push factors, however, are mostly not affected by the crisis and some may even be 
exacerbated. Large wage differentials, scarce employment opportunities and imperfections in 
financial markets are likely to persist, if not worsen, in origin countries. When economic growth in 
host countries resumes after the financial crisis, the pull factors will once again come into play 
adding to the already strong push factors. In light of these considerations, we predict that short 
sighted nationalist policies to stop migration flows are unlikely to make a significant effect on the 
global migration patterns in the long run.   Kiel  Policy  Brief  10  6 / 13 
Romania. Under such circumstances, return migrants might even hamper the economic 
recovery of their home countries. 
While the crisis may induce only a limited amount of return migration, dire job prospects 
abroad will almost certainly delay or halt outmigration plans of many potential migrants. 
Thus, the level of the migrant population may stabilize in the short to medium run. Once the 
global economy picks up again, outmigration rates will follow suit. 
The effects of the severe economic crisis in destination countries are felt not only by 
(potential) migrants, but also by their families back home. Reduced and uncertain 
employment and earning opportunities have already caused a sharp reduction in remittance 
flows to many origin countries of migrants (Figure  5). Countries like India, Poland and 
Moldova have seen their remittances fall by more than 20 percent. The World Bank (2009) 
predicts that total remittan-
ces to developing countries 
will decline by 7-10% in 
2009 and may stabilize in 
2010. With the likely return 
of many of their temporary 
migrants from Russia, 
Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia are expecting the 
largest decrease in remittan-
ces among all developing 
regions (see Box 2). 
Less income from remit-
tances and in some cases 
the reintegration of former family members may significantly diminish migrant families’ 
welfare, pushing some of them below the poverty line. The resulting decline in remittances-
driven consumption will also have macroeconomic repercussions. This puts additional strain 
on many developing countries, where the economic crisis is already expected to add 
64 million people to the population living under US$ 2 a day (Chen, Ravallion, 2009). Such 
unfavorable conditions in origin countries may ultimately even strengthen the push factors of 
migration to seek better opportunities abroad (Box 1). 
As the global recession weakens pull factors while strengthening push factors, it is difficult 
to predict how migration flows will change on balance. In the case of the US-Mexico 
migration corridor, underlying demographic factors, particularly the difference in labor supply 
between Mexico and the US, have been shown to play a dominant role (Hanson and 
McIntosh, 2009). The predominance of demographic factors, which are unaffected by the 
recession, leads to an inertia in migration dynamics such that the GDP contraction in the US 
and Mexico will probably not affect migration rates significantly (Taylor 2008; Richter et al. 
2006). 
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These insights demonstrate that the economic crisis will probably have only limited and 
temporary effects on international migration flows. Therefore, a hasty reorientation of 
migration policies in response to the crisis would not be appropriate. Even in times of 
economic slowdown, policies should adopt a long-run view to successfully manage labor 
migration. 
Policies for International Labor Migration 
In many host countries, the immediate response of immigration policy to the global economic 
crisis has been defensive, further tightening access to host country labor markets. Borders 
have been fortified further (US-Mexico), issuance of visas and work permits has been 
stopped or restricted (Malaysia, Thailand), quotas for skilled migrants have been limited 
(Australia, Italy, Kazakhstan, Russia), and migrants have been offered financial incentives to 
return home, on the condition that they would not return to the host country for a given period 
(Spain, Czech Republic, Japan; IOM, 2009b).  
Many such immediate responses are perceived as less than successful. The number of 
illegal immigrants residing in the US has reportedly declined by 13% since 2007, mainly 
because of increased enforcement that started even before the crisis (Camarota, Jensenius, 
2009). However, this decline may be short-lived. Tighter border controls coupled with 
increasing unemployment both in the US and Mexico may cause illegal immigrants already in 
the US to stay put, rather than return home for extended stays (as they did in the past). 
Similarly, few immigrants have taken up financial incentives on offer in several countries that 
would oblige them to return home for an indefinite (or at least prolonged) period. The 
program in the Czech Republic has been relatively successful in enticing workers to go 
home; 1,345 (mainly Mongolian) workers applied compared with the targeted 2,000.
1  
                                                  
1   The Czech Republic Pays for Immigrants to Go Home, The Wall Street Journal: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124087660297361511.html  
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However, similar programs in Spain and Japan had scant uptake: these countries aimed 
to have 100,000 and 200,000 applications, but only had 4,000 and 360 applicants as of April, 
respectively.  
More fundamentally, it is apparent in many areas, from international trade policy to 
financial services regulation, that national responses to a global crisis are ineffective unless 
















Source: World Bank (forthcoming). 
Box 2. The economic crisis and migrants in Russia
After the United States, Russia is the second biggest immigrant destination in the world and the
most important destination for migrants from countries of the Commonwealth of Independent
Sates (CIS), such as Tajikistan or Moldova. Many migrants move to Russia to escape
unemployment and support their family back home, often taking seasonal jobs for many years in a
row (Human Rights Watch, 2009). Because of the global recession, Russia’s economic outlook is
deteriorating, along with the job prospects for foreign workers. The IMF (2009) forecasts that
Russia’s GDP will contract by 6.5% this year. The unemployment rate increased from 5.3% in
September 2008 to 9.9 % in May 2009 (ILO, 2009a) and may increase further to 12% by the end 
of the year (ILO, 2009b). The construction sector, which alone employs approximately 40 percent
of Russia’s migrant workers (Human Rights Watch, 2009), has declined by close to 40%. As a
result, many migrants have already been laid-off or have not been paid their wages for several 
months. 
In order to fully account 
for the consequences of un-
employment among foreign 
workers, it is important to 
also focus on migrants’ fami-
lies back home. Remittances 
received from relatives 
working in Russia are an 
important income source for 
many countries of the former 
Soviet Union. As an 
example, for 60% of remit-
tance-receiving house-holds 
in Moldova, these money 
transfers finance more than 
half of their current expen-
diture (Luecke, Omar 
Mahmoud, Pinger, 2007). 
While most of the additional 
income is spend on daily 
needs, some amount is also 
allocated to consumer dura-
bles and larger household 
investments. 
With the decline in economic activity and rising migrant unemployment in Russia, remittances 
have fallen. In the first quarter of 2009, total outflows from Russia to CIS countries declined by 
31% year-on-year (World Bank, forthcoming). During the same period, incoming remittances 
declined by 39% in Tajikistan and by 35% in Moldova, tracking closely the worsening situation of 
the Russian construction sector.  
Remittances are large in relation to GDP in many CIS countries; for example, inflows in 2007
amounted to 46% of GDP in Tajikistan and 34% in Moldova in 2007 (World Bank, 2009).
Therefore, the decline in remittances tends to affect economic welfare substantially. As estimated
by the World Bank (forthcoming), a 50% decline in remittances would increase the poverty rate of
Tajikistan by up to 7 percentage points. 
Migrants in Russia are not only losing their jobs, but are also facing an growing anti-migration 
sentiment. To protect national workers, the Russian government cut its quota for new migrants in
2009 (IOM, 2009). Moreover, some employers abuse foreign workers by not paying them their
salaries (ILO, 2009c). Immigrants also seem to suffer from increased violence and xenophobia
since the beginning of the financial crisis; twice as many migrants were murdered in 2008
compared with the previous year (ILO, 2009c).  Kiel  Policy  Brief  10  9 / 13 
they are at least carefully coordinated. Pushing labor migrants to return home under current 
conditions would not only create hardship for many migrants and their families, but would 
also deprive their home countries of a crucial inflow of capital and source of domestic 
demand. Protectionist responses in immigration policy essentially seek to shift adjustment 
costs to individuals and countries that are even less well placed to shoulder the burden. This 
approach not only contradicts global development goals such as poverty reduction that all 
UN member states have agreed to in the 2001 United Nations Millennium Declaration. 
Protectionism is also shortsighted because in a globalizing world one country cannot lastingly 
enhance its own wellbeing through policies that impair the welfare of others. 
Therefore, immigration policy, even during a global recession, should follow a long-term 
strategic focus on the potential contribution of international labor migration to poverty 
reduction and economic growth in the developing world. This approach calls for policies that 
(i) create additional opportunities for labor migration, not limited to high-skilled individuals; 
and (ii)  are politically feasible in high-income host countries because they demonstrably 
generate positive net benefits for host-country natives. While the circumstances of individual 
host countries differ, the general thrust should be clear: International labor migration is 
already a key element in the ongoing integration of national economies. It benefits individuals 
in developing countries of origin without serious negative side-effects in host countries. Its 
expansion would not only be in line with global development policy goals, but also with the 
properly understood self-interest of high-income host countries in growing prosperity in their 
global neighborhood. 
The following guidelines may be helpful in designing appropriate policies: 
1.  Expand temporary work programs for low-to-medium skilled workers. 
Programs could be targeted to occupations or labor market segments where immigrants 
will compete less intensely with host country residents. Migrants would be obliged to 
return home after a set period; therefore, their access to host country social transfers 
could be limited and their social security contributions (except for health insurance) could 
be channeled to home country social security systems. Temporary work programs would 
typically be based on bilateral agreements between home and host countries. While 
such programs have not been trouble-free in the past, they would expand legal migration 
without running into the sort of political resistance that permanent immigration faces, 
especially during a pronounced economic downturn. 
2.  Improve integration of immigrants in all spheres of host countries’ societies. 
In many host country labor markets, immigrants still face outright discrimination and 
school achievements for immigrant children also lag behind natives. As a result, many 
immigrant children are growing up in relative deprivation and without positive role models 
of adults who are economically successful and socially integrated. Better integration of 
immigrants in labor markets and education systems would reduce the fiscal cost of 
immigration in terms of current and future social transfers. Efforts by a wide variety of 
actors would be helpful, from business associations promoting equal-opportunity hiring 
practices to NGOs facilitating migrants’ access to public healthcare and schools offering 
language training to ensure that migrant children are literate in both their native and host 
country languages. At the same time, it is appropriate for host countries to require new   Kiel  Policy  Brief  10  10 / 13 
immigrants to make an up-front effort towards integration, for example by learning the 
language of the host country. 
3.  Offer continuous regularization for long-term irregular immigrants. 
Some host countries have long tolerated a large amount of illegal immigration, to the 
point where irregular migrants have access to public services like health care and 
schooling without fear of deportation. While this approach is admirable on humanitarian 
grounds, such irregular immigrants are still unable to obtain legal employment and are 
thus susceptible to exploitative work practices and de-facto travel restrictions which 
make it difficult for them to maintain contact with their families at home. Where irregular 
migration is widely tolerated, the current practice of large, but infrequent and politically 
controversial regularization campaigns should be replaced with a continuous regulariza-
tion process for long-term irregular immigrants with clean criminal records and employ-
ment histories. 
4.  Manage high-skilled migration. 
Many high-income countries allow permanent immigration by high-skilled workers from 
anywhere in the world, based on a minimum salary to be guaranteed by the prospective 
employer, previous study at a host country university, or a points system that takes into 
account a large number of skills and family characteristics. Such transparent provisions 
should be encouraged and extended. High-skilled immigrants may increase the produc-
tivity of resident workers while creating only limited distributional conflicts and can 
improve the net impact of immigration on the skill level of the host country labor force. At 
the same time, however, selective immigration policies may lead to brain drain in some 
emigration countries. To cushion these adverse effects, an international and flexible 
code of conduct should be implemented to control the active international recruitment of 
skilled workers in critical sectors such as health care. In addition, social security contri-
butions in host countries should be made portable so that high-skilled emigrants are not 
discouraged from taking up economic opportunities in their home countries. 
5.  Support migrants through information, job placement, training, and protection from abuse 
International migration involves a variety of risks related to travel, residence in the host 
country, and employment. These risks may be compounded in the case of irregular 
migration which is wide-spread in many migration corridors. Home and host countries 
should cooperate to provide full information to potential migrants about migration options 
and where to obtain assistance in cases of abuse, etc. Home countries should facilitate 
job placement for work abroad, be it through governmental or private agencies, and 
ensure that education systems provide necessary skills for work abroad, such as foreign 
languages. When the departure of high-skilled individuals threatens to lead to a brain 
drain from the home country, home countries and donors may cooperate to provide 
vocational training to replenish the pool of skilled workers. 
6.  Systematically integrate Diasporas in the development process of their home countries. 
Many migrants maintain close links to their home countries by sending remittances, 
travelling, voting in elections, etc. These links should be supported and harnessed for   Kiel  Policy  Brief  10  11 / 13 
home countries’ economic development. Such policies are especially relevant for 
(temporary) migrants who reside in the host countries for economic reasons, but 
ultimately plan to return to their home countries. For example, existing social investment 
funds demonstrate how migrants can be encouraged to contribute to communal 
development at home, with funds from the government or donors matching the 
contributions of migrants. 
7.  Facilitate return migration where appropriate. 
Some countries with historically large out-migration have subsequently experienced 
rapid economic development. Over time, higher incomes have slowed out-migration and 
even led to substantial return migration (e.g. Ireland, Poland). If such return migration is 
accelerated by the current recession, some support for re-integration into the labor 
market at home may be appropriate, for example through job placement offers that 
target labor migrants abroad. Elsewhere, the jobs held by labor migrants abroad may 
simply have disappeared (as in the construction industry in Russia) and return migration 
may be a necessity rather than a choice. For such countries, short-term employment 
programs funded by the government or donors may be appropriate, particularly if 
migrants have acquired skills (for example, in the construction industry) that can be used 
productively in public works. 
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